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Abstract: 
What makes something confusing? Confusion is a common response to challenging, abstract,  and complex 
works, but it has received little attention in psychology. Based on appraisal theories of emotion, I suggest that 
confusion and interest have different positions in a two-dimensional appraisal space: interesting things stem 
from appraisals of high novelty and high  comprehensibility, and confusing things stem from appraisals of high 
novelty and low comprehensibility. Two studies—a multilevel correlational study and an experiment that  
manipulated comprehensibility—found support for this appraisal model. Confusion and interest are thus close 
relatives in the family of knowledge emotions. Keywords: aesthetics, emotion, confusion, interest, appraisal 
theories 
Article: 
According to my students, psychology professors are an irascible, fickle, and nefarious bunch. Of the 
many cruel things that psychology professors do, requiring undergraduates to visit the campus museum is 
among the cruelest. (My friends who work in the campus museum assure me that disaffected grumbling and 
disgruntled sighs carry well in the high-ceilinged rooms.) Many students see a museum trip as punishment, 
particularly if a brief paper is involved. And  these papers are revealing—students usually write about being 
irked and perplexed, about not understanding what the big deal is, about not getting it. What does aesthetics 
research have to say about this kind of experience? 
Unfortunately, confusion is a typical response to the arts. Given the beleaguered state of contemporary art 
education, many people lack the training and knowledge needed to understand challenging and abstract works, such 
as modern painting, experimental music, or contemporary literature. Just as curiosity breeds knowledge, 
confusion breeds ignorance. When confused,  people usually withdraw and spend their brainpower on 
something else. But if we know what confusion is, what it does, and how it works, we may be able to make art 
less confusing and to turn confusion into an educational tool. 
The present research examines confusion by comparing it with interest, a widely-studied emotion. What 
makes things confusing or interesting? Why do confusing things—such as complex books, obscure movies, 
or tricky ideas—sometimes become interesting? Of the  knowledge emotions, interest has probably received 
the most attention, both in mainstream  emotion research (e.g., Izard, 1977; Silvia, 2008b) and in empirical 
aesthetics (Berlyne, 1974; Silvia, 2005b). Confusion, in contrast, has received little attention in any area of 
psychology, apart from a preliminary study of facial expressions (Rozin & Cohen, 2003) and comments on that 
work (e.g., Ellsworth, 2003; Hess, 2003; Keltner & Shiota, 2003). In this article, two studies examine the cognitive 
appraisals that predict confusion and that cause experience to shift from confusion to interest. 
Confusion and Interest as Knowledge Emotions 
 
One way to simplify the sprawling world of emotion is to classify emotions into families, such as positive 
emotions (Fredrickson, 1998), moral emotions (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999), and self-conscious 
emotions (Tracy & Robbins, 2007). Confusion and interest fit into a family of knowledge emotions, along with 
the emotions of surprise and awe (Keltner & Haidt, 2003; Konecni, 2005; Ludden, Schifferstein, & Hekkert, 
2009). The knowledge emotions are caused by people’s beliefs about their own thoughts and knowledge, and 
these emotions stem from goals associated with learning. Just as people have goals associated with achievement 
and safety, people have goals associated with knowing, thinking, and understanding. People can appraise how 
events in the world impinge upon those goals, and they can assess their resources related to meeting them. 
The notion of confusion as an emotion is unseemly, if not scandalous, to many emotion psychologists. 
Researchers in the basic emotions tradition, for example, propose that there are  only a handful of basic 
emotions (Ekman, 1992). To join this list, an emotion must pass a high hurdle (e.g., cross-cultural and 
developmental evidence), and confusion clearly doesn’t pass it. Researchers in other traditions, such as the 
appraisal tradition, are more open to new emotions. The most extreme view, suggested by Scherer (2001; 
Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003), is that each 
point in the n-dimensional appraisal space has an associated emotion. Most of the emotions are too subtle, 
complex, or uncommon to appear in natural language, but they presumably exist nevertheless. 
This is a debate that aesthetics researchers can sidestep. Confusion is an interesting experience, and it 
is worth understanding what causes confusion and what confusion does. In  this sense, declaring confusion an 
emotion, a cognitive state, or a metacognitive attribution  doesn’t make it less relevant to understanding 
people’s experience of challenging and unfamiliar art. Like awe, beauty, chills, and surprise, confusion is 
aesthetically interesting regardless of how we classify it. 
Nevertheless, the small body of work on confusion suggests that it is worth exploring confusion’s 
emotional nature further. Modern emotion theories define emotions in terms of  their components, such as 
experiential, expressive, physiological, cognitive, and behavioral components (Scherer, 2001). Confusion has 
a valenced experiential quality: it’s a familiar  experience that people can describe. Furthermore, facial 
expressions of confusion are common and easy to recognize. In their study of emotional expressions in 
everyday contexts, Rozin and Cohen (2003) found that confusion was one of the most commonly observed 
expressions. Later work showed that it was easy for raters to identify confused states based on facial 
expressions, using the Facial Action Coding System (Craig, D’Mello, Witherspoon, & Graesser, 2008). 
Confusion’s expression was first discussed by Darwin (1872/1998) in the context of barriers to cognitive goals: 
―A man may be absorbed in the deepest thought, and his brow will remain  smooth until he encounters some 
obstacle in his train of reasoning, or is interrupted by some disturbance, and then a frown passes like a shadow 
over his brow‖ (p. 220). In short, there’s enough work on confusion’s emotional qualities to motivate more 
research. 
An Appraisal Approach to Confusion and Interest 
An emotion’s cognitive component is usually defined as its appraisal structure, the set of appraisals that 
bring about the emotion (Lazarus, 1991; Scherer, 2001). Appraisals are  evaluations of how events in the 
world relate to one’s goals, values, knowledge, and abilities. The province of appraisal theories, appraisals are 
viewed as both the causes of an emotion and as a means of describing and classifying an emotion. 
Appraisal research on interest illustrates what an appraisal approach to emotion looks  like. Research has 
found evidence for two appraisals, both metacognitive. For interest, people are appraising how new information fits 
with what they know and expect (a novelty–complexity appraisal) and whether they can understand the new, 
complex thing (a coping potential  appraisal). Many studies have shown that people find things interesting 
when they appraise them as both new and complex and as comprehensible (see Silvia, 2006b, 2008b). Figure 1 
illustrates this appraisal structure as a two-dimensional appraisal space. Interest’s appraisal structure is  both a 
model of interest’s causes and a way of classifying interest: it is similar to emotions that involve appraisals of 
novelty (e.g., surprise) and to emotions that involve appraisals of coping potential (e.g., fear/anxiety). 
To date, no appraisal research has examined confusion. Nevertheless, past writing suggests that 
confusion may share interest’s appraisal space. Ellsworth (2003) speculated that confusion may stem from 
appraisals of uncertainty, an appraisal dimension in the Smith and Ellsworth (1985) appraisal model. 
Uncertainty is part of a family of variables that includes novelty, complexity, conflict, and unfamiliarity 
(Berlyne, 1960). In fact, Berlyne (1960) speculated that confusion results from information that evokes more 
than one concept and thus creates cognitive conflict. Like interest, then, confusion may involve an appraisal 
of high novelty–complexity. Keltner and Shiota (2003) suggested that ―confusion is the feeling that the 
environment is giving insufficient or contradictory information‖ (p. 89); this resembles the  appraisal of 
one’s ability to understand. Interest and confusion may thus share the same  appraisal space: they are 
probably similar in some respects (i.e., appraisals of high novelty–complexity) and different in others (i.e., 
appraisals of high vs. low comprehensibility). 
Figure 1 depicts predictions that could be made about the appraisal structure of  confusion. First, 
confusion may entail only high novelty, reflecting a state of uncertainty. Second, confusion may entail only low 
comprehension, reflecting an inability to understand. And third, confusion may share interest’s appraisal two-
dimensional appraisal space, albeit with a different value on the comprehensibility dimension: confusion may 
stem from appraising something as  novel and as hard to understand. 
The Present Research 
The present research examined the appraisal space of confusion and interest. Experiment  1 examined 
the within-person relationships between the two appraisals and the two emotions. Experiment 2 examined 
whether manipulating appraisals of comprehensibility causes a shift  from confusion to interest. Taken 
together, the studies provide information about confusion, a neglected knowledge emotion, and illustrate 
relationships between confusion and interest. 
Experiment 1 
Does confusion covary naturally with appraisals? In Experiment 1, people viewed images and provided 
ratings of interest, confusion, and appraisals for each picture. This design allowed 
an estimate of the typical within-person relationships between the appraisals and the emotions. 
Method 
Participants 
Sixty-one people—48 women and 13 men—enrolled in General Psychology at the  University of North 
Carolina at Greensboro (UNCG) participated as a part of a research option. Gender effects weren’t estimated 
because of the small number of men in the sample. 
Procedure 
People participated in small groups. The experimenter explained that the study was about people’s 
impressions of different kinds of art. People viewed 14 black-and-white pictures taken from books and journals 
of experimental visual art: the artists were Reed Altemus, Marcia  Arrieta, Christian Burgaud, David Chirot, 
Jim Leftwich, Gustave Morin, Spencer Selby, and  Andrew Topel. Most of the pictures have been used in past 
research on interest (Silvia, 2005a, 2005c, 2006a, 2008a). 
After viewing each image, people completed 7-point semantic-differential scales. These scales measured 
feelings of interest (interesting–uninteresting, boring–exciting) and confusion (confusing–clear, perplexing–
obvious) and the appraisals of novelty–complexity (simple–complex, unfamiliar –familiar, common–unusual) and 
comprehensibility (comprehensible–incomprehensible, easy to understand–hard to understand). Similar items have 
been used in past research (see Silvia, 2005a; Turner & Silvia, 2006). 
Results and Discussion 
The experimental design has a multilevel structure: responses to the 14 pictures are  
nested within 61 people. The interdependence of the scores violates assumptions of conventional 
regression models. The extent of nesting is shown by intraclass correlations (ICC), which  describe the 
percent of variance in the outcome at the between-person level. The ICCs were .162 for interest and .070 for 
confusion, which indicate that most of the variance in interest (83.8%) and in confusion (93%) is at the within-
person level, the level of appraisal ratings. This is a good sign because the study hopes to explain variance in 
interest and confusion with people’s within- person appraisal ratings. 
The relationships between appraisals and emotions were estimated with a multivariate multilevel model 
(Heck & Thomas, 2009; Skrondal & Rabe-Hesketh, 2004). Appraisals of novelty–complexity and 
comprehensibility were the Level 1 predictors, and interest and  confusion were the outcomes. The Level 1 
predictors were centered at each person’s mean (i.e., group-mean centered), and their effects were modeled as 
random. The model was estimated with Mplus 5.2, using maximum-likelihood estimation with robust standard 
errors. Figure 2 shows  the model and the unstandardized effects. 
Both appraisals predicted both emotions. Within-person variation in interest was  significantly 
associated with variation in novelty–complexity (b = .448, SE _ .061, p < .0001) and in comprehensibility (b = 
.402, SE _ .046, p < .0001): interesting pictures were rated as complex and comprehensible. Within-person 
variation in confusion was significantly associated with  variation in novelty–complexity (b = .293, SE _ .046, p 
< .0001) and in comprehensibility (b = - .473, SE _ .041, p < .0001): confusing pictures were rated as complex 
but incomprehensible. The results thus show that confusion and interest have the same two-dimensional 
appraisal space. 
Experiment 2 
In the face of novel events, changes in comprehension should cause changes in confusion 
and interest. Experiment 2 thus manipulated appraisals of comprehensibility; to simplify the  design, 
complexity was held constant at a high level. People read two complex poems by the same author. For the first 
poem, everyone simply read the poem and rated feelings of confusion and interest afterward. Prior to reading 
the second poem, however, half of the people received  information that would help them understand the poem, 
whereas the other half simply read the poem. The clue about the poem’s meaning ought to reduce confusion 
and increase interest. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
Fifty people (29 women, 21 men) participated as part of a research option. Four nonnative English 
speakers were excluded, yielding a final sample of 46 people. Each person was randomly assigned to one of two 
between-person conditions: no information or extra information. 
Procedure 
People participated in small groups. The experimenter explained that the study was about people’s 
impressions of different kinds of writing. People expected to read some poems and to  rate them on different 
dimensions. The poems were taken from The Life of Haifisch, a book of abstract poems by Scott MacLeod 
(1999). For the first poem, all participants received the  following information: 
The following page has a poem by Scott MacLeod. Please read it, see how you feel about it, and then 
give your impressions and reactions on the following pages. This poem is titled The Whitest Parts of 
the Body, and it’s from his book The Life of Haifisch. 
They then read the poem, which is obscure, abstract, and complex. The first stanza, for example, 
 
is 
such daring against men 
with a throat so big 
separated by a hundred years full of 
misfortune: the bloody flux. taken by a fit of 
madness prone to eating human flesh  and 
measured, in due course, by naturalists. 
Afterward, people rated their feelings of interest and confusion. Interest was measured with I found the poem 
interesting; confusion was measured with I found this poem confusing. The items were completed using 7-point 
scales (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). 
The manipulation of extra information appeared after everyone had read and rated the  first poem. The 
next page in the packet provided information about the second poem. People in the Extra Information 
condition read 
The following page has another poem by Scott MacLeod, called A Widespread and Popular Notion, 
from the same collection of poems. This poem, like the last poem, is about killer sharks. 
The final sentence, which provides a clue to the poem’s meaning, was not provided to people in the No 
Information condition. Everyone then read the poem: like the first poem, it is obscure and complex. The first stanza, 
for example, is 
 
how absurd this idea is 
often more swift or agile 
with an air of seeming regret. 
Afterward, people rated their feelings of interest and confusion, using the same items. 
Results and Discussion 
The design combines a within-person variable (Time: First Poem vs. Second Poem) and a between-person 
variable (Extra Information: No vs. Yes), and it has two outcomes (interest and confusion). Consistent with the 
mixed design, the intraclass correlations for interest (.157) and confusion (.114) indicated some interdependence 
in the scores. A multivariate multilevel model was thus used to estimate the effects. In this model, interest and 
confusion scores were treated as simultaneous outcomes that were predicted by the two independent variables. 
As in Experiment 1, the model was estimated with Mplus 5.2, using MLR estimation, which provides  
unstandardized regression effects. No effects for gender were found, so it isn’t discussed further. 
Did providing information about the poem affect confusion and interest? For interest,  the multilevel 
model found non-significant main effects for time (b = .413, p = .13) and extra information (b = .180, p = .59) 
but a significant interaction between them (b = 1.474, p = .006). For confusion, the multilevel model found a 
main effect for time (b = -1.739, p < .001), no main effect of extra information (b = .157, p = .63), and a 
significant interaction between them (b = - 1.807, p < .001). 
Within-person comparisons clarify the patterns of these interactions, which represent  how the 
information about the poem’s meaning affected interest and confusion. People in the no-information group 
responded similarly to the poems: they found the second poem equally interesting (b = -.291, p = .45) and less 
confusing (b = -.875, p = .018) than the first poem. People in the extra-information group, in contrast, 
benefitted from the clue: they found the  second poem significantly more interesting (b = 1.182, p = .002) and 
significantly less confusing (b = -2.682, p < .001) than the first poem. 
Experiment 2 thus extends the evidence for the appraisal space of interest and confusion.  If these 
emotions differ primarily in the appraisal of comprehensibility, then increasing this appraisal should shift 
experience from interest to confusion. Manipulating people’s ability to understand a complex poem—in the 
form of a clue about the poem’s broader meaning—made the poetry less confusing and more interesting, thus 
providing an experimental replication of Experiment 1’s correlational findings. 
General Discussion 
Psychology doesn’t know much about the knowledge emotions. Charles Darwin  (1872/1998), in his 
classic book on emotional expression, discussed states of astonishment, amazement, meditation, and 
abstraction. But despite this distinguished start, research on  knowledge emotions—awe, interest, surprise, and 
confusion, labeled ―epistemological emotions‖ by Keltner and Shiota (2003)—languished for nearly a hundred 
years. The present research  explored confusion as a response to unusual visual art and poetry. From an appraisal 
perspective, confusion can be construed in terms of the appraisals that predict it. Appraisal spaces can depict an 
emotion’s ostensible causes and illustrate how different emotions—such as confusion and interest—are related. 
The evidence from two studies suggests that confusion and interest share a two- dimensional 
appraisal space, shown in Figure 1: they both involve appraisals of novelty–complexity and of 
comprehensibility, but they differ in whether people’s ability to understand the event is low (confusion) 
or high (interest). In Experiment 1, interest and  confusion in response to visual art and to poetry were 
distinguished by their within-person relationships with comprehensibility. In Experiment 2, readers who 
received a clue to a poem’s meaning found it more interesting and less confusing. The evidence appears 
across two domains (visual art and poetry) and in both correlational and experimental designs, so the 
appraisal evidence appears to be robust. 
I should emphasize that the within-person effects represent more than mere correlations between the 
appraisals and the emotions. First, within-person models avoid the between-person confounds that plague typical 
correlational designs. In Experiment 1, for example, each person had 14 scores for each predictor and 
outcome but only one score for gender, intelligence, openness to experience, and every other between-
person variable. Because the one between- person score is invariant across the 14 within-person scores, it 
obviously cannot explain the covariance of the 14 appraisal scores with the 14 emotion scores. This robustness 
to the classic third-variable problem is a major appeal of multilevel designs. 
Second, the within-person effects represent coefficients within a model that has multiple predictors and 
multiple outcomes, so the effects are estimated in light of the covariance between  the predictors and the 
covariance between the outcomes. Experiment 1’s design is correlational, but the statistical analysis imposes a 
model structure on the data. Unlike a matrix of simple correlations, these effects cannot simply be interpreted in 
isolation or flipped in direction. For example, making confusion a predictor and coping potential an outcome will 
not yield similar effects. 
Exploring Islands of Aesthetic Experience 
The present research is part of my ongoing interest in unusual aesthetic states (Silvia,  2009). Empirical 
aesthetics emphasizes subtle feelings of pleasure, consistent with its roots in philosophical aesthetics. Mild, 
sublime feelings are important, and many contemporary theories explain these feelings well (e.g., Hagtvedt, 
Hagtvedt, & Patrick, 2008; Leder, Belke, Oeberst, & Augustin, 2004; Martindale, Moore, & West, 1988; 
Whitfield, 2009). But people have a wide range of aesthetic experiences, and theories of aesthetic pleasure do 
not always explain unusual states well. Some unusual states are well-known in other fields but haven’t attracted 
the attention of aesthetics researchers; emotions such as anger (Silvia & Brown, 2007), disgust (Cooper &  
Silvia, 2009), and surprise (Ludden et al., 2009) are good examples. Other unusual states are complicated 
human experiences that are hard to pin down, such as aesthetic chills (McCrae,  2007), the experience of 
beauty (Armstrong & Detweiler-Bedell, 2008), and feelings of awe,  thrills, and being moved (Konecni, 
2005). A grand theory of aesthetic experience, one that  unifies these different theories and effects, may not be 
possible, but I imagine that aesthetics research will eventually build bridges between these islands of research. 
Putting Confusion to Work 
All emotions have a behavioral tug—they incline people to broad classes of actions  (Frijda, Kuipers, 
& ter Schure, 1989). In this functional sense, interest and confusion are  opposites. Interest motivates 
learning, exploring, seeking information, and engaging with new things (Silvia, 2006b); confusion presumably 
motivates withdrawing, avoiding, and shifting to something different. This makes confusion a problem for 
educators, who want to promote engagement instead of avoidance. Nevertheless, confusion presents an 
educational opportunity for art educators. 
By reflecting on their emotions, people can use their feelings for information and can  modify the 
emotion–action link. A common example is from anger management, which (among other things) encourages 
people to think about what their angry feelings mean instead of merely feeling mad. For confusion, people can 
be encouraged to think about the fact that they feel  confused.
1
 (The facial expression of confusion—a puzzled 
look familiar to all instructors—can help teachers identify the perplexed.) If people learn that confusion is a 
signal that something is awry cognitively, then they can use it as information about the effectiveness of their 
learning strategies. People can thus use confusion as a signal that they need to shift their tactics—such as ask for 
help, consult experts, reread basic sources, or take a break—instead of as a signal to give up and shift to 
something else. By turning confusion into a constructive signal, psychologists can have a clean conscience when 
they force their students to visit the dreaded campus museum. 
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Footnote 
1. As an aside, reflecting on feelings of confusion turns the metacognitive state of  confusion into a 
meta-metacognitive state: people are thinking about what they were thinking about their thoughts. (I find this 
a bit confusing.) 
 
 
